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CREATED BY SECTION 9 OF THE LAW REFORM
Aer 1936
Louise Affleck
With its ancestry based in the early Workers' Compensation Acts, s 9 of the Law Reform Act
1936 was intended to be a general rule to provide that where there is a wrong perpetrated by a
person who is insured, the injured person can have a lien on the insurance moneys. This
article discusses the scope and functions of s 9, identifies some problems and suggests that,
after 60 years, it is time to review this piece of legislation.
I THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INSURER AND THE
THIRD PARTY
Where the insured is indemnified under a contract of insurance, s 9 of the Law Reform
Act 1936 creates a statutory charge over the insurance money "on the happening of an event
giving rise to a claim for damages, or compensation" (the event). The creation of a charge
effectively takes the insurance money out of the assets of the insolvent estate, in the same
way that assets subject to a security in favour of a third party do not form part of the assets
for distribution to the general body of creditors.
The relationship between the insured and the insurer is governed by the contract of
insurance (the contractual action). The relationship between the insured and the third party
is determined by the law giving rise to the claim by the third party against the insured (the
primary action). If the liability of the insured is established in the primary action, the
insurer may make payment directly to the third party, but the third party cannot insist upon
* Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand. This article is an extract from a paper submitted in
partial fulfilment of the LIM degree at Victoria University of Wellingtan.
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that as the third party is not a party to the contract of insurance which confers on the
insurer the obligation to pay.
Unlike the English legislation,1 s 9 of the New Zealand Law Reform Act 1936 does not
assign the insured's rights and obligations under the contract of insurance to the third
party. Section 9 creates a charge over the insurance money payable to the insured under the
contract of insurance. The charge arises by virtue of the statute and exists independently of
the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer. The relationship can be
expressed as follows:
INSURER
Statutory Charge
Contract
INSURED THIRD PARTY
Primary Action
Section 9(4) enables the third party to enforce the charge by way of action against the
insurer, and the parties to the action "shall, to the extent of the charge, have the same rights
and liabilities, and the Court shall have the same powers, as if the action were against the
insured." This provision allows the insurer to stand in the shoes of the insured in respect of
the primary action and raise any defence to the primary action that was available to the
insured.
In denying the existence of a charge, can the insurer rely on any defence it would have to
an action by the insured to enforce the contract of insurance? In contrast to the New South
2
Wales legislation, s 9 does not expressly allow the insurer to raise, as a defence to an
1 The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930 (UK) provides that, upon insolvency, the insured's rights
against the insurer are "transferred and vested" in the third party. The rights transferred to the third party are
subject to any defence available to the insurer to an action by the insured to enforce the contract of insurance.
Post 0#ice v Nomich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [19671 2 QB 363; [19671 1 All ER 577 (CA). In effect, the
third party stands in the shoes of the insured and can have no better claim against the insurer than the insured
has under the contract of insurance.
2 The proviso to s 6(4) of the Law Reform Act (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW), states: "[L]eave shall
not be granted in any case where the court is satisfied that the insurer is entitled under the terms of the contract
of insurance to disclaim liability".
THIRD PARTIES AND THE INSOLVENT INSURED 629
action by the third party (the statutory action), any defence it would have to an action by
the insured to enforce the contract of insurance.
Although there is no equivalent provision in the New Zealand legislation, the courts
have accepted that where the insurer is not liable to the insured the statutory action will
fail. The insurer can rely on defences it would have to an action by the insured to enforce
the contract of insurance because s 9(1) provides that the charge arises "on all insurance
money that is or may become payable" in respect of the insured's liability to the third party.
If the insurer is not liable under the terms of the policy, then no insurance money becomes
3
payable and consequently no charge arises.
However, in allowing the insurer to raise, as a defence to the statutory action, those
defences available to it in the contractual action, the courts have assumed that the third
party stands in the shoes of the insured. Because s 9 does not assign the insured's rights to
the third party, it is not correct to state that the third party stands in the shoes of the
insured vis a vis the insurer.
To sunlmarise:
(a) the insurer stands in the shoes of the insured and may raise any defence available to
the insured in respect of the primary action;
(b) the insurer can deny the existence of a charge in favour of the third party by raising
any defence it would have to an action by the insured to enforce the policy;
(c) strictly speaking, the third party does not stand in the shoes of the insured in respect
of an action to enforce the contract of insurance, as the third party's rights arise not
under the contract of insurance but under the statutory cause of action created by
S 9;
(d) the nature and scope of the relationship between the insurer and the third party is
accordingly defined by s 9 and not by the contract between the insured and the
insurer.
The absence of a contractual relationship between the insured and third party raises
several difficult issues:
(a) will a breach of the contract of insurance by the insured enable the insurer to avoid
4
the charge;
3 See Part III of this article.
4 See Part III of this article.
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(b) what if any, limitation period applies to the statutory action;5
(c) what is the effect of contractual provisions which avoid the operation of the charge
created by s 9.6
These issues are relevant both to the exercise of the court's discretion to grant leave and
to the stafutory action to enforce the charge.
II FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE EXERCISE OF THE DISCRETION TO
GRANT LEAVE
Proceedings against the insurer require leave of the court unless the case fits within one
7
of the circumstances set out s 9(2). The Act does not specify the factors which are relevant
to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave, but the courts have established a number of
principles which will briefly be discussed.
A Establishing an Arguable Case
The third party must establish an arguable case against the insured before leave will be
granted to issue proceedings against the insurer.8 Although the third part must establish
an arguable case in respect of the primary action, the onus is not a high one. It appears that
an arguable case can be established on the pleadings, although the cases note that the
10
provision of some affidavit evidence is desirable.
If the contract of insurance does not cover the insured's liability in respect of the
primary action, there is no contract of insurance under which the insured is indemnified and
no question of the charge arising. In Independent Wool Dumpers Ltd v American
International underwriters (NZ) Ltd & Ors,11 the contract of insurance expressly excluded
damage resulting from the replacement or repair of products sold by the insured. The third
party purchased a defective product from the insured and claimed that the insured (and
5 See Part IV of this article.
6 See Part V of this article.
7 s 9(4).
8 Registered Securities Ltd v Brockett Unreported, 17 October 1991, High Court, Christchurch Registry, CP
298/87; Yates New Zealand Ltd v Wang New Zealand Ltd and Cooke Heating Ltd (in receivership) (1993) 7 ANZ
Insurance Cases 61-196 . In both cases, leave to issue proceedings against the insurer was refused
9 Above n 8, see also Plastic Recovenes & Manufocturing Ltd & Anor v Wright Machinery Ltd & Ors (1991) 6
ANZ Insurance Cases 61-051 ("Plastic Recoveries").
10 Campbell v Mutual Life and Citizens Fire and General Insurance (NZ) Ltd [1971] NZLR 240, 243 ; Yates above n
8, 78,246-78,247; Registered Securities above n 8, 12.
1 1 (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases, 61-152 (HC).
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thereby the insurer) was liable for the repair and replacement costs of the defective product.
Although the third party had a claim against the insured, it was not a liability which the
insurer had agreed to cover.
12 13,
In both Independent Wool Dumpers and AFG Insurances Ltd u Andjelkovic, it was
held that the third party must establish that the event is an insured risk as a threshold issue
to the granting of leave to commence the statutory action. In Independent Wool Dumpers it
was a question of law whether the contract of insurance covered the insured's liability in
respect of the primary action. In AFG Insurances Ltd it was a question of fact whether the
event was an insured risk and whether a contract of insurance was in force at the time of
the happening of the event. The Federal Court of Australia there held that leave would not
be granted where the third party was unable to show any arguable case that the event was
within the terms of the contract of insurance.
14
In Plastic Recoveries the insurer declined the claim on the basis that certain conditions
in the contract of insurance had been breached by the insured. Master Towle stated that the
onus was on the insurer to show that it was entitled to decline the insured's claim under the
15
contract of insurance. Similarly, in State Insurance General Manager v Maaka the Court of
Appeal stated that if the insurer could establish it was entitled to disclaim liability under
the terms of the contract of insurance, leave would be declined.
The cases therefore establish that at the stage of applying for leave the third party need
only establish:
(a) an arguable case in respect of the primary action;
(b) the existence of a contract of insurance;
(c) the event is an insured risk.
If there is a factual dispute as to any of these matters, then the proper course is for leave
to be granted. However if there is no factual dispute, or if it is established as a matter of law
that there is no liability to the insured, then leave to proceed against the insurer will be
refused.
12 Above n 11.
13 (1981) 1 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-443.
14 Above n 9.
15 (1989) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-943 (CA).
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B The Existence of a Financially Sound Defendant
The insured must be of doubtful solvency before the courts will entertain an application
16
for leave to commence a statutory action against the insurer. However, it is not necessary
for the insured to be bankrupt or in liquidation before leave will be granted to enforce the
charge. In Manettas v Underwriters of Lloyds (contract no 68011140) & Anor17 the court
rejected the insurer's argument that the insured should be put into bankruptcy before leave
is granted to issue proceedings against the insurer.
Nor is the existence of other potential defendants a ground for refusing leave to issue
proceedings against the insurer. In FAI (NZ) General Insurance Co Ltd v Blundell and Brown
18
Ltd the third party obtained judgement against the insured before applying for leave to
enforce the charge against the insurer. FAI argued that the third party should exhaust its
rights against other potential defendants before leave was granted to issue proceedings
against the insurer. That argument was rejected in the Court of Appeal by Richardson J "If
the insured is apparently impecunious there can be no justification for postponing recourse
against the insurer and expecting the claimant to bear the cost of pursuing other possible
defendants.
„19
The other members of the court agreed that to refuse leave on this basis
would deprive the third party of its election as to which party to sue and create an
20
unjustified windfall for the insurer.
The existence of other potential defendants will not enable the insurer to avoid the
operation of s 9. If a defendant (A), other than the insured (B), fully compensates the third
party, then (provided A has a right to contribution from B) A can claim the benefit of the
charge against the insurer of B. In National Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd v Commonwealth of
21
Australia, the Commonwealth, having been found liable to the third party, was able to
claim a charge over any insurance money due to the insured, even though the insured had not
been joined to the original proceedings. It was held that the insured's liability to pay
damages included any contribution which the insured might be required to pay as a joint
22
tortfeasor.
16 Campbell v Mutual L<fe and Citizens Fire and General Insurance Company (NZ) Ltd [1971] NZLR 240, 243;
Oswald v Bailey (1987) 11 NSWLR 715; 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-807.
1 7 (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-180.
18 [1994] 1 NZLR 11 (per Hardie-Boys D.
19 Above n 18, 15.
20 Above n 18; see also David J Reid (NZ) Ltd v CE Health Casualty and General Insurance (NZ) Ltd (1992) 7 ANZ
Insurance Cases 61-137.
21 (1981) ANZ Insurance Cases, 60-438 ("National Mutual").
22 See also Hatea Motors Ltd v Foote (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases, 61-130.
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C General Discretion
The discretion under s 9 is limited only y the need to exercise it in a manner which is
consistent with the policy of the legislation.
The facts in National Mutual provide a good illustration of the factors which the court
24
might regard as relevant to the exercise of its general discretion to refuse leave. In that
case the party seeking to enforce the charge was the insured's employer who did not wish to
sue the insured directly. There was also a significant delay (some 12 years) between the
primary action arising and the insurer being advised of the existence of the claim. Moffit J
held that the existence of a special relationship between the insured and the third party was
not a sufficient reason to allow the insurer to be sued directly. Delay in bringing the
statutory action will be relevant as potentially showing that the insurer is prejudiced in
having to defend a claim of which it has no knowledge and little assistance with from the
insured.
25
Anderson J in Yates doubted whether a general discretion to refuse leave existed under
s 9. The insured could not seek to escape liability on the grounds of difficulty in tracing
witnesses, and in his view the insurer should not be able to resist the grant of leave on the
grounds of inconvenience any more than the insured could.
The Parliamentary Debates support Anderson J's view that the purpose of s 9(4) is to
ensure insurers were not sued directly when the insured is solvent, the reason being a
26
disinclination on the part of insurers to have their name publicly attached to proceedings.
However, there is now a respectable body of authority that a general discretion does
27
exist and the comments by Anderson J in Yates are not binding as leave was refused on
other grounds.
23 David J Reid (NZ) Ltd v CE Health and Casualty and General Insurance (NZ) Ltd (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases
61-137,77-709; National Mutual Fire Insurance Company Limited u The Commonwealth of Australia (1981) ANZ
Insurance Cases 60-438. Hatea Motors Ltd v Foote (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-130.
24 Above n 21, 77,307.
25 Above n 8.
2 6 (1936) 247 NZPD 236-50.
27 Above n 23; See also Lissenden v Yorkville Nominees Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) & Ors (1984) 4 ANZ Insurance
Cases 60-692 (per Mahoney JA); FAI (NZ) General Insurance Company Ltd v Blundell & Brown Ltd [1994] 1
NZLR 11 (per Hardie- Boys J); Grimson v Aviation and General Underwriting Agents Ltd (1991) 7 ANZ
Insurance Cases 61-095 (per Kirby P).
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III DEFENCES AVAILABLE TO THE INSURER UNDER THE
CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
The article has already considered the situation where the event giving rise to the claim
28
against the insured is not a risk insured against under the contract of insurance. The
situation where the event is an insured risk but the insurer is entitled to disclaim liability
under the policy is now considered.
A Pre-event Breach/Pre-event Condition Precedent
In New South Wales the equivalent provision to s 9('4) contains a proviso, not present in
the New Zealand legislation, that leave must not be granted where the insured is entitled to
„ 29
disclaim liability under the policy (the "proviso ).
The effect of this proviso was considered in Lissenden v Yorkville Nominees Pty Ltd (in
30
Liq) and Ors. The application for leave proceeded by way of an agreed statement of facts;
it was common ground that one of the insureds had made a false statement in a proposal and
the contract of insurance incorporated the proposal as a term of the policy. The majority of
31
the Court of Appeal and (on a subsequent appeal) the High Court of Australia, did not
consider it necessary to refer to the proviso to refuse the third party leave to issue
proceeding against the insurer.
As the judgements of the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the High Court in
Lissenden demonstrate, the absence of the proviso in the New Zealand legislation is not
significant. If the insurer is entitled to avoid the contract of insurance prior to the event
giving rise to a claim for damages by the third party then, under s 9(1), no insurance money
'becomes payable" and consequently no charge arises.
B Post-event Breach/Post-event Condition Precedent
Generally, the insurer's liability to the insured arises either at the time of the event
giving rise to a claim by the third party or when the insured lodges a claim with the insurer.
Conditions relating to the notification of claims and providing assistance to the insurer
after the event are commonly stated in the policy as conditions precedent to the liability of
the insurer to the insured. Will a post-event breach or a failure by the insured to fulfil a
post-event condition precedent affect either the creation of the charge or its ultimate
enforceability?
28 See Part U A of this article.
29 See above, n 2.
3 0 (1984) 3 ANZ Insurnace Cases 60-597 ("Lissenden")
31 Yorkville Nominees Pty Ltd (in hq) & Ors v Lissenden (1986) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-692.
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With the exception of Kirby P in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the courts
accept that the insurer can rely on matters occurring after the event to avoid liability to the
32
third party in respect of the statutory action for enforcement of the charge.
A useful summary of the approach adopted by Kirby P is contained in his judgement in
33
MeMillan v Mannix & Anor In his view, once the event giving rise to a claim for damages
against the insured occurs, the third party's fights are determined by the statute and not the
contract of insurance. Kirby P accepts that if the insurer is entitled to disclaim liability at
the time of the event then the third party is not entitled to the beneficial operation of the Act.
Where Kirby P differs from the approach taken in other cases is in his view that the
third party's statutory rights cannot be denied by matters subsequent to the creation of the
charge, even if those matters might have relieved the insurer of its obligations to the insured.
In his view the policy of the legislation is to protect the third party, not the insurer or the
insured. Conduct or transactions subsequent to the event are not relevant to enforcement of
the third party's statutory rights as s 9(1) acts to "freeze" or maintain the status quo at the
time that the charge is created.
With respect, that view must be incorrect. If the insurer is entitled to disclaim liability
to the insured, then under s 9(1) no insurance money becomes payable to the insured. As the
creation of the charge is linked to the event, and not to the contract of insurance, it is
submitted that matters occurring after the event will not prevent the creation of the charge,
but the enforceability of the charge may be affected by those subsequent events. To hold
otherwise would be to create a situation where the insurer is liable to the third party in
circumstances where it would not be liable to the insured.
The legislation is not intended to increase the liability of the insurers. As Meagher J said
34
in McMillan;
The purpose is to enable the [third party] to have recourse against funds paid or payable by
the [insurer] to the insured) in respect of the injury of which the [third party] complains. It
does so by granting a charge over the moneys paid or payable. In this manner it prevents the
[insured] from either disbursing the moneys amongst its creditors or frittering it on its own
purposes; it also prevents the [insured] and its insurer making a corrupt bargain But the
converse is also true. If there are, absent a corrupt bargain, no moneys payable to the insured,
32 MeMillan v Mannix & Anor (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-194; Oswald v Bailey (1987) 4 ANZ Insurance
Cases 60-807; NSW Medical Defence Union Ltd v Crawford (N02) (1994) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-226;
David J Reid (NZ) Ltd uCE Heath Casualty and General (NZ) Insurance Ltd (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-
137; Maaka v State Insurance General Manager (1989) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-962.
33 (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-194.
34 Above n 33.
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there is no right for the [third party] to have a charge over anything or an action against the
insurer. ... It was not the purpose of the section to increase the liability of the insurers.
35
Reference should also be made to Kirby P's comment in McMillan that his approach to
the legislation has been adopted by Thomas J in Independent Wool Dumpers. Thomas J
approved of Kirby P's analysis of the policy behind the legislation contained in Oswald v
36
Bailey and Ors; Crawford v Bailey and Ors. That case was concerned with the issue of
whether the insurer could, after the event, vary the terms of the contract of insurance and
not the issue examined in McMillan of whether a breach by the insured would entitle the
insurer to avoid liability to the third party. Independent Wool Dumpers was concerned
with whether the event was an insured risk.
In the author's view, Thomas J's approval of the approach adopted by Kirb*P is limited
to general support for Kirby P's analysis of policy behind the legislation. Thomas J
clearly accepts that the insurer should not be liable to the third party in the absence of any
38
liability to the insured:
I consider that it would be easier to escape the prongs of Morton's fork than it would be for
the [third party] to avoid the limitations and exceptions in the policy. ... In all, [the insured]
could not arguably sustain a claim for indemnity against [the insurer], and the [third party]
standing in [the insured's] shoes is in no better position.
In considering matters occurring subsequent to the event giving rise to a claim for
damages against the insured, regard must also be had to whether the third party can invoke
the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977. Before examining that issue, it should be noted that in
the author's view, not all conditions precedent to the insurer's liability to the insured will
enable the insurer to avoid liability under the statutory action. If the condition in the
contract of insurance is not a true condition precedent to the insurer's liability to the
insured, but rather a condition precedent to recovery by the insured, then it is submitted that
39
the statutory charge will override such a provision.
C The Insurance Law Reform Act 1977
In some circumstances the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 will operate to prevent the
insurer from disclaiming liability to the insured. Because the third party does not stand in
35 Above n 33,78,204.
36 (1987) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-087. (Note: The author has not examined the issue of whether the insurer
can unilaterally vary the contract of insurance, as the situations in which this could occur are probably rare.)
3 7 Above n 11, 77,804.
38 Above n 11, 77,810.
39 See Part Vof this arhcle.
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the shoes of the insured vis a vis the insurer, there is an argument that the third party cannot
rely on the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 as there is nothing in either the Law Reform Act
1936 or the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 which specifically enables the third party to
rely on the latter Act.
However, the insurer, in establishing that it is entitled to disclaim liability to the
insured, would need to have regard both to the terms of the policy and the applicable law. If
the remedial provisions of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 prevent the insurer from
declining liability to the insured, then the insurance money is available to the third party
via a statutory action against the insurer.
40
In David J Reid (NZ) Ltd v CE Heath Casualty and General Insurance (NZ) Ltd the
insured failed to give notice and supply particulars of the third party's claim to the insurer.
It was assumed that the third party could rely on s 9 of the Insurance Law Reform Act
41 42
1977 to prevent the insurer disclaiming liability to the insured. However it was not
necessary to decide the issue of prejudice to the insurer under the Insurance Law Reform Act
1977 because the court recognised it had a general discretion to refuse leave under s 9 of the
Law Reform Act 1936 in situations where lack of early notice of the claim caused prejudice
to the insurer.
Where an insurer declines liability to the insured, the insurance contract frequently
imposes a limitation period for the taking of action against the insurer. Does the expiry of
the contractual limitation period affect the existence of the charge?
43
In Maaka cover was declined because the insured failed to comply with the insurer's
request for further information about the claim. The policy further provided that the
insurer was not liable under the policy unless the insured took action to enforce the policy
within a certain period. The Court of Appeal held that the insured's failure to comply with
a condition to take action to enforce the policy within a certain period entitled the insurer
to disclaim liability to the insured. There being no liability to indemnify the insured, leave
to commence the statutory action was refused.
40 (1992) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-137.
41 Section 9 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 provides that a failure by the insured to comply within time
limits for notifying the claim or issuing proceedings against the insurer shall not be a ground for disclaiming
liability unless "[I]n the opinion of the court or arbitrator determing the claim the insurer has in the particular
circumstances been so prejudiced by the failure of the insured to comply with such a provision that it would be
inequitable if such provision were not to bind the insured."
42 The same assumption was made in Maaka but the Cour t of Appeal was not required to consider whether s 9 of
the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 would assist the third party because the claim arose before the inception of
that Act.
4 3 Above n 15.
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In this situation, the court could not use its general discretion to grant leave under s 9(4)
of the Law Reform Act 1936 because under s 9(1) there is no insurance money payable to the
insured. The third party would have to rely on s 9 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977
to avoid the operation of a contractual limitation period.
Regard must also be had to whether the third party can invoke s 11 of the Insurance
Law Reform Act 1977 to prevent the insurer from relying on non-causative breaches of the
policy to decline liability. For s 11 to apply:
(a) the contract of insurance must exclude or limit the liability of the insurer on the
happening of certain events or on the existence of certain circumstances; and
(b) the Court must find that the happening of such events or circumstances was in the
view of the insurer likely to increase the risk of the loss occurring; and
(c) the insured can prove that the loss in respect of which the insured seeks indemnity
was not caused or contributed to by the happening of the event or the existence of
such circumstance.
If (a), (b) and (c) are met then the insurer is not entitled to refuse to indemnify the insured.
It has been held that conditions precedent relating to notification of claims fulfils
44
requirement (a), but there is a divergence of judicial opinion on requirements (a ) and (c).
45
In Nupin Distribution Ltd v Harlick the insured delayed making the claim, made a false
statement to the insurer, and admitted liability to the third party. The insurer denied
liability on the grounds of failure by the insured to fulfil three conditions precedent. Wylie J
held that requirement (b) was met because an insurer would regard delay, provision of a
false statement and an admission of liability as likely to increase the risk of an insured's
liability to third parties.
Nupin Distribution Ltd should be contrasted with the position of the Court of Appeal in
Forbes v NZ Insurance Co Ltd.46 In that case a failure by the insured to make a truthful claim
did not fulfil requirement (b) because the statement was made after the motor vehicle
accident and was therefore not likely to increase the risk of any loss or damage to the motor
vehicle. The Forbes case concerned first party insurance and it is submitted the position is
different in respect of liability insurance where a failure to make a claim or an admission of
liability after the event may increase the ultimate liability of the insured (and thereby the
insurer) to the third party.
44 Sampson v Goldstar Insurance Co Ltd (1980) 1 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-043; Nupin Distribution Ltd v Harlick
(1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-784; Forbes v NZ Insurance O Ltd (1988) 5 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-871.
45 Above n 44.
46 Above n 44.
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If the insurer is prejudiced by the failure of the insured to fulfil a condition precedent
then requirement (c) is unlikely to be met. For example, if the insured does not notify the
claim to the insurer and allows judgment to be entered against the insured on an admission
of liability, then the insurer may argue the risk it has agreed to cover has increased because
it has been denied the opportunity to deny liability and defend the claim.
In sununary:
(a) if the insurer is not liable to the insured, then no insurance money becomes payable,
and consequently the statutory action to enforce the charge will fail;
(b) it is likely that the parties to the statutory action can rely on the Insurance Law
Reform Act 1977, although in reality there is little difference between the exercise of
the court's discretion under s 9 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977, and the
47
court's general discretion under s 9 of the Law Reform Act 1936;
(c) whether s 11 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 applies will depend on the facts
in each case, in particular, whether the third party can prove that non-compliance
with a condition precedent has not contributed to the loss which the insurer is
otherwise required to indemnify.
IV LIMITATION PERIOD ON THE STATUTORY ACTION
Leave to enforce the charge will be refused when delay in bringing the primary action
gives rise to a defence that the third party is barred from proceeding further by the
Limitation Act 1950. If the primary action is statute barred, s 9(4) enables the insurer to set
up any defence to the statutory action which is available as a defence to the primary action.
This part of the article considers whether the statutory action is subject to an independent
limitation period.
A The Current Position
48
In Grimson v Aviation and General (Underwriting) Agents Ltd, proceedings had been
issued against the insured within the limitation period, but the insured went into
liquidation and the third party did not seek leave to issue proceedings against the insurer
until after limitation period for the primary action had expired. The majority of the New
South Wales Court of Appeal, Kirby P dissenting, held that the limitation period for the
enforcement of the charge runs in tandem with the primary cause of action against the
insured. This conclusion was reached from an analysis of s 6(4) of the Law Reform Act
1946 (NSW), the material part of which is identical to s 9(4) of the New Zealand legislation.
47 See Part H C of this article.
48 (1991) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-095.
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Meagher J (with whom Hope AJA concurred), interpreted the section as allowing any
defence available in the primary action to be raised as a defence to the statutory action. In
determining the limitation period on the statutory action the court must ask this question:
What would be the third party's position if he or she began proceedings against the insured
in the primary action at the date of applying for leave to proceed against the insurer in the
statutory action? If at the date of applying for leave the primary action is statute barred, the
third party is also barred from proceeding with the statutory action.
However, in Grimson the primary action was not statute barred as the proceedings
against the insured had been commenced within the limitation period for that action.
Nevertheless, Meagher J said the statutory action was statute barred because the statutory
action was not commenced within the limitation period for the primary action. Although the
section allows the insurer to raise any defence available to the insured, the majority
decision in that case effectively allowed the insurer to raise a limitation defence which was
not available to the insured.
As leave to commence proceedings against the insurer will not generally be granted
while the insured is solvent, if insolvency occurs after the expiry of the limitation period for
the primary action, it will then be too late for the third party to enforce the charge. Kirby P,
in the dissenting judgment in Grimson, held that leave should be granted even though the
limitation period for the primary action has passed. His reasoning was that the purpose of
the Act, to provide relief in the event of the insured's insolvency, would be too easily
frustrated if there was a limitation period on the statutory action.
Kirby P noted that Parliament did not prescribe a specific limitation period on the
49
statutory action. He construed the proviso in the section as providing a general discretion
to grant leave, with prejudice to the insurer arising from delay in bringing the statutory
action being one factor to consider. Although there had been gross delay in pursuing the
statutory action, the insurer did not suffer any prejudice through lack of notice of the claim
because it had earlier been joined as a third party to the primary action. Accordingly, in his
view, leave should be granted.
Prior to Grimson, the limitation period on the statutory action had been considered by
50
two inferior New South Wales courts. Both cases adopted the view that the limitation
period on the statutory action runs in tandem with the primary action.
4 9 Above n 48, 77,386.
50 Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd v Lissenden (1987) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-776; Ratclee v VS & B Border Homes
Ltd (1987) 4 ANZ Insurance Cases 60-789.
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The expiry of the statutory limitation period in the primary action in Maaka was not
raised by the insurer as a grounds for refusing leave to proceed with the statutory action.
Although the Court of Appeal was not required to decide the point, it did note, without
expressing a view, the decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Cambridge Credit
52
Corp v Lissenden. The Court of Apgal in Maaka was concerned with a limitation period
imposed by the contract of insurance.
54
In Hatea Motors Ltd v Foote it was accepted by the parties (without any argument or
reference to the Australian cases) that the limitation period on the statutory action was the
same as the limitation period on the primary action. The argument in that case focused on
whether proceedings in respect of the statutory action commenced when the application for
leave was filed or when leave was in fact granted. The court held that the statutory action
was within the limitation period if a statement of claim against the insurer was filed with
the application for leave. The court was not referred to the Court of Appeal's obiter
55
comment in Maaka, where it was said that it was not sufficient for the application for
leave to be filed prior to the expiry of the limitation period; leave must be granted and
proceedings to enforce the charge issued prior to the expiry of the limitation period in the
primary action.
Heron J in the High Court hearing of FA16 considered that the limitation period on the
statutory action would commence only when the insurer declined the insured's claim under
the policy. In his view, the third party was subject to the same limitation period as the
insured in terms of an action against the insurer. Although this approach achieves the right
result from the third party's perspective, it assumes that the third party stands in the shoes
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of the insured. As previously discussed, the insurer has the same rights as the insured in
respect of the primary action. However, the converse is not true; the third party does not
necessarily have the same rights to enforce the insurance policy as that held by the insured.
Limitation issues arose for consideration in FAI8 where the Court of Appeal accepted
that the limitation period for the statutory action runs in tandem with the primary action. In
51 Above n 15.
52 Above n 50.
53 See Part III B of this article.
54 Above n 23.
55 Above n 15, 76,165.
56 (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 62-183.
57 See Part I of this article.
58 Above n 18.
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FAI the primary action against the insured, being an action in equity seeking an account of
profits arising out of a breach of a fiduciary duty, had no limitation period. Applying s 9(4),
the Court of Appeal treated the statutory action as having the same limitation period as the
primary action; the insured could not have relied on a statutory limitation period, and the
insurer was in no better position.
In FAI the court was not required to consider the situation in which the primary action
is subject to a limitation period and proceedings against the insured have been issued within
the limitation period, but leave has not been sought to pursue the statutory action within the
limitation period of the primary action. However, just such circumstances did recently come
59
before the High Court in UEB Packaging v QBE Insurance where Baragwanath J
expressed strong support for the majority view in Grimson, saying that unless the statutory
cause of action by the plaintiff against the insurer shadows the cause of action against the
60
insured, the clear language of the section is departed froin.
These approaches, as well as an argument that the statutory action is subject to its own
limitation period under the Limitation Act 1950, are considered next.
B What Limitation Period should apply?
The author considers that the majority in Grimson was incorrect in finding that the
section imposed a limitation period on the statutory action against the insurer. If the third
party fails to commence the primary action within the applicable limitation period, then the
section enables the insurer to raise that as a defence to the statutory action; that is, the
section allows the insurer to rely on any limitation defence that was open to the insured.
To that extent FAI and Grimson were correctly decided.
However, Grimson goes further and allows the insurer to raise a limitation defence
which would not have been available to the insured. Richardson J in FAI, refers to the
majority approach in Grimson and seems to accept that the limitation period for the
statutory action runs in tandem with the limitation period for the primary action. Robertson
J does not express a view on this point. Hardie-Boys J considered that for limitation
purposes, time would cease to run on the statutory action upon the commencement of the
primary action against the insured. The basis for his reasoning being that the section places
the insurer in the same position as the insured.
Like Kirby P in Grimson, Hardie-Boys J also considered that there was a general
discretion to refuse leave in circumstances where the insurer is prejudiced by a late
5 9 [1996] 2 NZLR 467.
60 Above n 59, 481. See also Bailey v NSW MDU Ltd; NSW MDU Ltd v Cra€ord (1995) 8 ANZ Insurance Cases
61-291, which Baragwanath J cites with approval.
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application for leave to enforce the charge. In terms of balancing the interests of the parties,
the approach of Kirby P and Hardie-Boys J achieves the right result by avoiding hardship
to the third party and preventing a potential windfall to the insurer. The author accepts
that a general discretion exists, but submits that there is a limitation period on the statutory
action which exists independently of the limitation period on the primary action.
It was argued in FAI that action to recover the insurance money subject to the charge
was an independent cause of action created by stafute; and therefore it was subject to a
limitation period of six years.61 Richardson J rejected this argument finding that s 9 "[Ils a
procedural provision... It merely makes available to the claimant a more effective procedure
for enforcing rights." That view must be incorrect as, except for s 9, there is no common law
or statutory right to issue proceedings against the insurer to recover money due under the
contract of insurance. Richardson J supports his conclusion with the observation that the
section puts the insurer in the same position as the insured for the purposes of the primary
action and the third party "should be in no better or worse position if seeking to proceed
„62
against the insurer than if proceeding against the insured.
The section deals with defences to the primary action. It does not impose a limitation
period on the statutory action. If the primary action against the insured is not issued within
the limitation period for that action, that is a defence available to the insurer in the
statutory action. The source of the third party's rights against the insurer are statutory, and
the limitation period on the statutory action must be prescribed by statute if one is to apply
at all.
In the author's view, the statutory cause of action created by s 9 is "an action to recover
a sum due under an enactment" and a limitation pe*d of six years from the date of the event
applies under s 4(1)(d) of the Limitation Act 1950.
On this analysis, a limitation defence can be raised by the insurer if six years elapse
between the event giving rise to a claim against the insured and the commencement of the
statutory action against the insurer. To avoid limitation problems the third party would be
required to seek leave to commence the statutory action prior to the expiry of the six year
period, even if the insured was not at that time, insolvent.
An alternative approach, and one that causes less hardship to the third party, is to
recognise that the charge is in the nature of a security. An action to enforce the charge, like
6 1 Limitation Act 1950, s 4(1)(d).
62 Above n 18, 1Z
63 See, for example, the application of s 4(1)(d) of the Limitation Act 1950 to statutory misfeasance proceedings
against directors under the Companies Act 1955, s 320; Re: Network Agencies Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 325.
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any other security, would not be subject to any limitation period, but would be enforceable
at the suit of the chargeholder. The insurer's position could be protected by the exercise of
the court's general discretion to refuse leave in circumstances where the insurer is
prejudiced by lack of notice of the claim. The difficulty with this approach is that the charge
is created by statute, therefore the third party should look to statute to find the means for
enforcing the charge. As s 9 is silent as to the limitation period on the statutory action, the
better view is that s 4(1)(d) of the Limitation Act 1950 imposes a limitation period on the
statutory action.
Whether New Zealand courts continue to favour the approach adopted by the majority
in Grimson, or the six year limitation period imposed by s 4(1)(d) of Limitation Act 1950, the
result is unsatisfactory from the third party's perspective. The third party is generally
unable to issue proceedings against the insurer while the insured is solvent. There is a real
risk, therefore, that the limitation period on the statutory action will expire before the third
party has an opportunity to enforce the charge.
If s 9 is to be retained, then the section should be amended to clarify the position on
whether the statutory cause of action is subject to an independent limitation period. In the
author's view, provided the primary action is commenced in time, there should not be any
limitation period on the statutory action. The insurer's position could be protected by the
exercise of the court's general discretion to refuse leave in circumstances where delay in
bringing the statutory action causes prejudice to the insurer.
This was the approach favoured by Kirby P in Grimson and Hardie-Boys in FAL It
achieves the right result by avoiding hardship to the third party and preventing a potential
windfall to the insurer. However, the author believes that s 9(4) does not achieve this result
64
and amendment to the legislation is required.
V CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO RECOVERY BY THE INSURED
This article has previously considered situations where a breach of the contract of
insurance or a failure by the insured to fulfil a condition precedent enables the insurer to
65
avoid liability under the contract of insurance. The contract of insurance usually
requires proof of loss before the insurer is required to make payment to the insured. Proof
of loss is normally established by the third party's judgment against the insured, settlement
of the claim, or payment to the third party (conditions precedent to recovery by the insured).
64 This view is clearly shared by Justice R D Giles, the Chief Judge of the Commercial Division, Supreme Court of
NSW in his recent article on s 6 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 in (1995) 7 ILJ 152.
65 Part III of this article.
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Obviously, these conditions frustrate the purpose of s 9 in situations where the insured
is insolvent. The article examines two conditions precedent to recovery by the insured with
a view to establishing that s 9 can override a specific contractual provision.
A Requirement of a Prior Judgment against the Insured
Section 9(5) makes it clear that the statutory action can proceed even if the third party
has judgment against the insured. What is the position where the contract of insurance
requires a judgment against the insured as a condition precedent to recovery by the insured?
This issue was considered in an English case where it was held the third party could not
commence an action against the insurer in the absence of a prior judgment against the
66
insured.
The position may be different in New Zealand, where the third party's rights are
determined by the statute and not the contract of insurance. The charge can, if permitted by
s 9, override the express provisions of the contract. Subsection (1) makes it clear that the
charge arises notwithstanding that the amount of the insured's liability has yet to be
determined. Subsection (4) expressly contemplates that action may be taken against the
insurer in the first instance and impliedly contemplates that the charge will be enforceable
directly against the insurer in the absence of prior judgment against the insured. It is implicit
in subs (5) that judgment against the insured is not a pre-condition to the enforcement of the
charge. Thus there is evidence of legislative intent for the charge to be enforceable against
the insurer notwithstanding that there is no judgment against the insured.
However, there is argument to the contrary. Subsection 9(1) provides for a charge to
arise over the insurance money payable under "a contract of insurance by which he [the
insured] is indemnified against liability to pay damages". How can it be said that the
insured is indemnified under the insurance policy when that policy expressly provides that
there is no indemnity until the insured's liability has been determined? Subsection (1)
provides for the charge to arise notwithstanding that the quantum of the insured's liability
to the third party has yet been determined. It does not provide that the charge will arise
notwithstanding that the insured's liability to the third party has yet to be determined.
This issue has not arisen in any of the Australian or New Zealand decisions. If the issue
arose, it is likely that the courts will try to avoid any construction that requires the third
party to obtain judgment or establish the insured's liability before the charge is enforceable
against the insurer.
There is no reason, in principle, why there should be a requirement to establish the
insured's liability prior to pursuing the insurer. If the third party is required to establish
66 Post O#ice v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 2 QB 363; [1967] 1 All ER 577 (CA).
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the insured's liability in the primary action before the charge is enforceable, this could be
achieved by joining the insurer to the primary action and running the statutory action in
tandem with it. In the author's view, this situation is contemplated by s 9(4).
B "Pay and be Paid" Clauses
67
There is House of Lords authority that the third party has no claim against the insurer
where the contract of insurance places an obligation on the insured to pay the amount of the
claim to the third party before seeking reimbursement from the insurer. This issue has arisen
in the context of "pay and be paid" clauses in insurance policies where the insurer has no
liability unless and until the insured had met the liability owed to the third party.
68
A similar issue was discussed in Independent Wool Dumpers, where Thomas J said:
The contingent nature of the cover is confirmed by the terms of condition 10 of the policy. It
reads as follows:
"Liability of the Company under this policy with respect to any occurrence shall not
attach unless and until the Insured, or the Insured's underlying insurer, shall have paid the
amount of underlying limits on account of such occurrence... ."
Stressing that this condition was couched in absolute terms, Ms Courtney argued for AIU that
no cover exists under the umbrella policy until the underlying insurer has actually paid the
amount of the underlying limit. While this interpretation is correct in terms of the policy, I do
not accept that it prevails so as to defer the statutory charge attaching to the insurance
money which is or may become payable pursuant to section 9 until the claims against the
underlying insurers have been pursued to completion. The fact that any such claim may not
have been exhausted simply means that the amount of the insured's liability has not been
determined. Section 9 expressly contemplates such a situation. To hold otherwise would be to
defeat the purpose of the section.
With respect, there is nothing in s 9 which expressly allows the charge to over-ride the
specific contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. The words
"notwithstanding that the amount of such liability may not have been determined" refer to an
intent for the charge to arise notwithstanding that the amount of the insured's liability to the
third party has yet to be settled by agreement or judgment. It does not refer to an intention
for the charge to be enforceable against the insurer regardless of whether the insurer's
liability to the insured is established.
67 The Fanti, The Padre Island. [1990] 2 Uoyd's Law Rep 191 (HL).
68 (1993) 7 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-152, 77,806. (emphasis added) The case was decided on other grounds, so
the comments do not form part of the ratio of the decision.
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It is apparent that "pay and be paid" clauses defeat the purpose of the legislation in that
the charge is only enforceable after the insured has met the claim of the third party. The
purpose of the legislation is not to create a windfall to the insurer in the event of the
insured's insolvency. In the author's view s 9 over-rides any conditions precedent to
recovery by the insured which avoid the operation of the charge created by the legislation.
Alternatively, the third party may be able to rely on the operation of s 11 of the Insurance
Law Reform Act 1977 to prevent the insurer disclaiming liability under a "pay and be paid"
69
clause.
VI "CLAIMS MADE AND NOTIFIED" POLICIES
Under a "claims made and notified" policy, the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured
for claims made during the currency of the policy, regardless of when the event giving rise to
the claim occurs. Thus the situation can arise where the event giving rise to a claim for
damages occurs at a time when there is no insurance policy in force. How can a charge
attach to something which is not yet in existence?
70
This issue was considered in Manettas, where it was held, applying a provision
identical to s 9(1), that the charge must attach at the time of the event giving rise to a claim
for damages. If there is no insurance policy in existence at that time, there can be no
insurance money capable of being charged. Cole J stated:71
If at the time [of the event] there is no policy there cannot be any insurance moneys "that are
or may become payable" in respect of that liability under any then existing policy. The section
does not say that a charge affixes in respect of insurance moneys which "are or may become
payable" under insurance policies which may be written in the future.
Cole J rejected the argument that the remedial purpose of the legislation should ensure
that the section was not interpreted in a narrow or pedantic way. Cole J was of the view
that the court is bound by the words used by the legislature where they are as clear as those
set out in s 9(1).72
The earliest reference the author has found to "claims made" policies is in an English text
published in 19683 and it appears that liability insurance, let alone of the "claims made"
variety, was not commonly available in 1936. As a matter of statutory interpretation, if
69 See Part nI C of this article.
70 Above n 17.
71 Above n 17, 78,032.
72 This issue was further considered in Schipp v Cameron (Unreported, 4 May 1995, Supreme Court NSW) where
Young J differed with Cole I's approach and held that the section does apply to "claims made" policies.
73 P Madge Professional Indemnity Insurance (Butterworths, London, 1968) 42.
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"claims made" policies were not contemplated by the legislature in 1936, the section can only
74
apply if the wording of the statute permits it.
The application of s 9 to "claims made" policies has yet to be fully considered in New
Zealand. The Court of Appeal in FAI reached the view that s 9 does apply to "claims made"
policies, but it is not apparent from the decision whether or not the Court had the benefit of
any argument on the issue.
It was acknowledged that s 9 does not advert to situations where the contract of
75
insurance comes into existence after the event giving rise to the third party's claim.
Richardson J considered that it was implicit in s 9(1) "and in accord with reality that the
charge cannot arise unless and until there is insurance money available out of which it can
be met".76 Without any further analysis, Richardson J concluded that the charge arose at the
time the insured entered into a "claims made" policy with the insurer.
That conclusion conflicts with the clear legislative intent expressed in s 9(1) that the
charge arises on the happening of the event. Even Richardson J acknowledged, earlier in
77
his judgment that that charge arose on the happening of the event. If there is no insurance
policy in existence at the time of the event there is no insurance money upon which the
charge can 'bite".
Hardie Boys J dealt with the issue in a slightly different way. Instead of looking at the
timing of the creation of the charge, he considered that the charge arose at the time of the
event but was conditional upon the insurer's liability being established. In the author's
view, the charge is conditional in the sense that the charge is not enforceable until the
insurer's liability to indemnify the insured is established. However, there is nothing in s
9(1) to suggest that the creation of the charge itself is conditional on some later occurrence.
If there is no insurance policy in existence at the time of the event, then no charge is
created. With respect, it is not open to the court to ignore the clear wording of a statute to
ensure it accords with developments which have occurred subsequent to the enactment of
the legislation. Even if the legislature had contemplated "claims made" policies in 1936, there
is nothing in the section that would allow the court to construe the charge as being capable
of arising at some time later than the happening of the event.
The section creates a fictional charge over the insurance money before the insurer has
accepted liability for the claim; there is no difference in principle between this, and the
74 J F Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 175-176.
75 Above n 18, 16 (Richardson J), 25 (Robertson J).
76 Above n 18, 16.
77 Above n 18.
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charge attaching to an insurance policy that has yet to come into existence. In other words,
if the charge can attach to non-existent insurance money, there is no reason, in principle,
why it should not attach to a non-existent policy. While this argument is attractive, it
ignores the requirement that a contract of insurance must be in existence at the time of the
event.
The position would be different if s 9 created at an assignment of the insured's rights
78
under the contract of insurance to the third party, as is the case in the English legislation.
Under English legislation, the assignment occurs when the insured becomes insolvent and
not upon the event giving rise to a claim for damages against the insured. Thus a "claims
made" policy would be in existence at the time that statutory rights are conferred on the
third party.
In the author's view, "claims made" policies are not subject to the application of the Law
Reform Act 1936. It may be that this significantly frustrates the purpose of the Act but the
clear wording of the Act does not permit any other interpretation. Nevertheless it is likely
that the court will strive hard to find an interpretation to the Act which keeps it up to date
with the development of"claims made" policies.
VII SUMMARY
At this stage it is appropriate to refer back to the introductory discussion on the legal
relationship between the insurer and the insured. Having considered the impact of s 9 on
the triangular relationship between the parties, the original diagram can now be re-
presented to more fully describe the relationship between the parties.
INSURER
Section
9(1)
INSURER THIRD PARTY
iINSURED i Section 9(4)
78 Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 (UK).
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Upon commencement of insolvency, the insured drops out enabling the insurer to stand in
the shoes of the insured in relation to defence of the primary action (s 9(4)). Unless the
insured is insolvent at the time of the event the third party requires leave to enforce the
charge. In determining whether leave should be granted the court has a general discretion to
refuse leave in circumstances where the insurer is prejudiced by delay in the application for
leave to enforce the charge.
Where the insurer is entitled to avoid the contract of insurance then under s 9(1) there is
no insurance money payable, and consequently nothing upon which the charge can attach.
With the exception of Kirby P in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the authorities
accept that the insurer can rely on the matters occurring subsequent to the event to disclaim
liability to the insured. The cases are correct in this approach as the legislation was not
intended to increase the liability of insurers.
However, in the author's view, a distinction can be made between conditions precedent
to the insurer's liability and conditions relating to proof of loss. If the contract of insurance
requires the insured to establish liability to the third party or meet the third party's claim
prior to the inception of the insurer's liability, then the purpose of s 9 is clearly defeated.
Section 9(1) makes it clear that the charge arises notwithstanding that the quantum of
the third party's claim has yet to be determined. Parliament could not have intended to
create a charge in favour of the third party only to allow the insurer prevent the
enforcement of the charge by the third party. In the author's view, conditions precedent to
recovery by the insured do not operate to defeat the enforcement of charge, as proof of loss
can be established by the third party in the statutory action.
It has yet to be established whether the statutory action is subject to its own limitation
period. Section 9(4) makes it clear that where the third party fails to commence the primary
action within the limitation period for that action, the insurer can rely on that as a defence
to the statutory action. More problematic is the situation where the primary action is
commenced in time but the statutory action is commenced outside the limitation period for the
primary action.
In the author's view, s 9 is silent as to a limitation period on the statutory action. If s 9 is
to be retained, then the legislation needs to be amended to clarify whether the statutory
action is subject of an independent limitation period. In the absence of amending legislation,
it is the author's view that s 4(1)(d) of the Limitation Act 1950 imposes a six year limitation
period on the statutory action.
The application of s 9 to "claims made" policies has yet to be fully considered. In the
author's view, these policies are not subject to the operation of the Law Reform Act 1936.
Although this significantly frustrates the purpose of the Act, s 9(1) clearly pre-supposes
THIRD PARTIES AND THE INSOLVENT INSURED 651
that a contract of insurance will be in existence at the time of the event giving rise to a claim
for damages by the third party.
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